Operator Strategy Model Development in UAV Hacking Detection

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***Abstract*—One increasingly relevant security issue for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, aka drones) is the possibility of a Global Positioning System (GPS) spoofing attack. Given existing problems in current GPS spoofing detection techniques and human visual advantages in searching and localizing targets, we propose a human-autonomy collaborative approach of human geo-location to assist UAV control systems in detecting GPS spoofing attacks. An interactive testbed and experiment were designed and used to evaluate this approach, which demonstrated that human-autonomy collaborative hacking detection is a viable concept. Using the Hidden Markov model (HMM) approach, operators' behavior patterns and strategies from the experiment were modeled via hidden states and transitions among them. These models revealed two dominant hacking detection strategies. Statistical results and expert performer evaluations show no significant difference between different hacking detection strategies in terms of correct detection. The detection strategy model suggests areas of future research in decision support tool design for UAV hacking detection. Also, the development of HMM models presents the feasibility of quantitatively investigating operator behavior patterns and strategies in human supervisory control scenarios.**

***Index Terms*—Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), cyber-attack detection, human geo-location, human supervisory control, hidden Markov model (HMM), strategy classification.**

I. Introduction

UNMANNED aerial vehicles (UAVs) have significantly increasing use in commercial and military applications. The continued growth in numbers and functionalities of UAVs have been accompanied by many security, privacy and regulatory concerns. One common security concern is UAV GPS spoofing, in which attackers deceive GPS receivers by providing counterfeit GPS signals in order to override UAV navigation systems and redirect UAVs to unexpected destinations [1], [2]. A well-known such incident garnered public attention in 2011 when a RQ-170 Sentinel UAV was captured using GPS spoofing attacks [3]. Therefore, successfully detecting GPS spoofing attacks is important for UAV control systems.

Understanding that human vision has advantages in complex searching and localizing tasks [4]–[6], we demonstrated a human-autonomy collaborative approach through geo-location in that humans can assist autonomous systems in the detection of possible GPS spoofing attacks on UAVs. In this study, this approach was evaluated via an experiment, which was designed and conducted using the Security-Aware Research Environment for Supervisory Control of Heterogeneous Unmanned Vehicles (RESCHU-SA) platform [7], extension of the platform from [8]. Experiment sessions simulated human supervisory multi-UAV control scenarios with potential UAV GPS spoofing attacks. Operators were able to successfully detect hacking events that 65% of total experiment sessions exhibited at least 80% correct hacking identifications. We also discovered that operators with significant video game experience were the best performers in hacking detection [9].

While this initial study demonstrated that human operators could successfully identify UAV GPS spoofing attacks through geo-location, given that such research has never before been conducted, our goal is to better understand what strategies emerged as novices attempted to determine if they had been hacked. To this end, it was advantageous to develop human behavior models to investigate operator behavior patterns, both in the execution of their primary task of supervising UAVs, and in attempting to thwart hacking attempts. Such models could be particularly useful as they could highlight training problems or interface design anomalies. Lastly such models could be used to develop predictive decision support tools that could assist human operators, particularly under areas of high workload and stress. The rest of this paper presents our efforts to develop strategy models of humans supervising multiple UAVs and determining whether a UAV had been hacked through human geo-location.

II. Background

A. UAV GPS Spoofing Detection

Remotely controlled UAVs typically rely on an embedded navigation system known as the Global Positioning System (GPS), which provides accurate localization information including position, velocity and time for UAV GPS receivers. GPS receivers can calculate precise latitude, longitude, height, and speed based on received satellite signals. However, GPS receivers are vulnerable to GPS spoofing attacks, in which GPS receivers are attacked by counterfeit signals generated from GPS spoofers [10]–[14]. Many autonomous GPS spoofing detection methods have been proposed in recent studies [11]–[17]. However, false alarms and detection failures still exist while applying autonomous GPS spoofing detection [10], [11], [15]. Therefore, more research is needed to improve autonomous detection systems.

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
The camera view if the real position of the UAV is in the corresponding rectangle (i.e., if the UAV is hacked)
The camera view if the real position of the UAV is in the corresponding rectangle (i.e., the UAV is NOT hacked)
[+]
[-]
[+]
[-]

Fig. 1. An example of GPS reported locations on the map.

UAVs are commonly equipped with both a GPS navigation system and payload camera, whose signal is independent of the UAV GPS signal. Thus, if these two signals are independent, the payload camera view can be used as a reference to assist autonomous detection systems in detecting UAV GPS-spoofing attacks. Based on the precondition that UAV payload camera views can provide the unbiased surrounding scene of UAVs, we propose that human operators can act as supplementary sensors and assist autonomous system to detect UAV hacking attacks through the comparative human geo-location method.

In human geo-location, an operator can compare the non-tampered video feed from the UAV payload camera to the potentially falsified GPS reported location on the map. This approach allows operators to detect inconsistencies, which indicate potential hacking attacks, between the location interpreted from the camera view and the GPS location reported on the map. In theory, such cross referencing could be accomplished automatically through autonomous localization and sensor-fusion techniques (e.g., [18], [19]), but these have not been very successful [20], particularly in military applications [21].

Based on feature integration theory, the first stage of human vision obtaining information from targets is the preattentive stage, in which a human observer can gather basic information about a target even before the observer become conscious of it [4]. Thus, human vision can process target information efficiently in complex environments. Human observers also tend to choose areas that maximize information of the target in a salience-driven visual search strategy [5]. In addition, the direction discrimination threshold of human vision has a low average of 1.8 degrees [6], which suggests human observers can precisely detect small changes in target movement orientation. Considering these human visual advantages, human operators can potentially assist in UAV localization and detect potential UAV GPS spoofing attacks.


System Health & Status Monitoring
Mission & Payload Management
N
2
1
Navigation
(Auto)Pilot
Flight Controls

Fig. 2. Human supervisory multiple UAV control architecture [22].

An example of human geo-location in UAV GPS spoofing detection is shown in Figure 1. The GPS reported location of the UAV is shown as the blue dome on the map in the upper right. If the UAV is under attack, the operator will observe the scene below the UAV through the camera, which would be different from the surrounding environment of the GPS-reported location on the map; e.g., as in the upper left camera-view in Figure 1. If the UAV is not under attack, the operator will observe the scene below the UAV, as in the upper-right camera view in Figure 1, matching the reported location. When a GPS-spoofing attack is confirmed, the operator can prevent losing the hacked UAV by overriding the physical controls.

B. Modeling Operator Behavior

The human geo-location approach to hacking detection is an example of a common UAV control scheme which incorporates human supervisory control, in which a human operator monitors a multi-UAV system, intermittently navigating UAVs, and conducting other higher-level tasks [23]. The hierarchical architecture of a human supervisory UAV control loop of single operator with multiple UAVs is shown in Figure 2 [22]. In this architecture, multiple parallel outermost loops represent the highest-level control of managing missions and payloads by human operators. The inner loops represent lower-level navigation and flight controls by autonomous systems or operators. This architecture can be introduced with various levels of automation. The successful control of higher-level operator loops depends on the success of lower-level autonomous system loops. In this study, we assume that human operators keep higher-level decision-making processes, and autonomous systems are in charge of lower-level UAV control and navigation operations [22].

In supervisory control settings where humans are supervising one or more autonomous systems, human operator behavior models are needed for multiple reasons:



14:14:49 Vehicle [2] has been assigned to target D.
14:14:54 Vehicle [2] has been assigned to target E.
14:15:18 Possible cyber attack under UAV [2]

Fig. 3. The RESCHU-SA experiment platform interface [7].

1) To investigate general operator behavior patterns, in order to determine if observed behaviors match the expected behaviors,
2) To investigate operators' strategies, in order to identify points of inefficiency or error,
3) Study both endogenous and exogenous factors that impact operator behavior patterns such as video game experience and task load,
4) Study how automation can improve operators' performance and success rate in task performance, including the use of predictive operator behavior models.

In terms of the hacking detection supervisory control setting we consider, we need a way to determine strategies that operators develop in their attempts to detect and mitigate hacking attempts, and how to improve upon those strategies that could include the use of automated decision support.

One problem with the generation of such models is that while interactions between a human operator and a supervisory control system can be directly observed through human physical interaction with an interface, such observations cannot be directly associated with a human thought, goal, plan or strategy. In order to develop operator models that link actions and behaviors to plans, goals, and strategies, we need a method that abstracts low-level physical interface interactions into higher operator behavioral states and strategies. We believe that a hidden Markov Modeling approach provides the foundation to do this, as described in the next section.

C. Markov Modeling Approaches

Markov models are widely-used to capture stochastic evolution of state transitions in the state-space [24]. Many studies have used Markov models to investigate low-level human actions [25], [26]. However, Markov models only capture observable interactions between human operators and control systems, which may not accurately reflect operators' high-level behavioral states. Therefore, Hidden Markov models, which are an extension of Markov models, could be a useful alternative in this regard.

A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is a two-layer stochastic model that describes a Markov process with a higher layer of indirectly observable system states and a lower layer of observable emissions from each state. The HMM formalism is widely used in machine learning, especially in speech recognition [27] and development of human operator behavior models in driving [28]. HMMs using an unsupervised approach to model training have been shown to provide more accurate operator behavior models over supervised learning approaches [29], [30]. Because an HMM model can present higher-level operator behavioral states using hidden system states based on lower-level operator interactions with a supervisory control system like a UAV ground control station, the HMM was selected as the modeling framework for this effort.

III. Data Generation

In order to develop models of operator behavior in the UAV supervisory control environment with potential hacking events, user interactions with such a system were needed to provide the underlying training data. To this end, we developed the Security-Aware Research Environment for Supervisory Control of Heterogeneous Unmanned Vehicles (RESCHU-SA) (now freely available to interested parties) [7], [8], [31]. RESCHU-SA is a Java-based simulation platform for a single-operator with multi-UAV supervisory control scenarios. It provides the flexibility to design multi-tasking scenarios including both navigational and imagery analysis tasks. Moreover, this platform provides capability for simulating UAV GPS spoofing attacks, in which hacked UAVs deviate from the originally assigned paths and target unexpected destinations, along with real or false notifications that simulate autonomous GPS spoofing detection systems.

The interface of the RESCHU-SA platform is shown in Figure 3. Five main components are featured in this interface, including the payload camera view, message box, control panel, timeline and map area. Specifically, the camera view displays the video stream of the surrounding environment beneath the selected UAV. The primary purpose of this view is to conduct imagery analysis tasks and can be used to determine the actual location of UAVs for detecting potential hacking events. The map displays the surveillance area with real-time locations of all UAVs, hazard areas and targets.

A. *Experiment Design*

To collect enough data to develop operator models, a set of experiments was conducted using RESCHU-SA. The primary objectives of operators using RESCHU-SA are to control multiple UAVs to: 1) determine whether UAVs are under GPS spoofing attacks, 2) perform reconnaissance imagery tasks of counting road intersections when UAVs reach assigned targets, and 3) ensure that UAVs do not encounter hazard areas.

Given that a previous study demonstrated that the task load can significantly impact an operators performance, and thus strategies [8], task load was the only controlled experimental variable in this experiment. Two objective task load levels, high vs. low, were introduced, and each participant had both task load scenarios in the experiment. In the low task load scenario, operators navigate three UAVs with six targets and six hacking notifications, including three real hacking notifications and three false alarms. In the high-task load scenario, operators navigate six UAVs with nine targets and nine hacking notifications, including five real hacking notifications and four false alarms. To simplify the hacking detection, no notification miss was introduced in the experiment that all real hacking events come with notifications.

In RESCHU-SA, operators are responsible for safely navigating UAVs to targets. Hazard areas can appear and disappear randomly, which require replanning the vehicle around these threat areas. In the experiment, GPS spoofing attack events with notifications followed a pre-defined schedule but appeared to randomly occur while an operator navigated the UAVs. Once an operator received a notification that a certain UAV was under possible cyber-attack, the operator could then investigate the potential UAV hacking by checking the UAV camera view and matching it against the position of the UAV on the map. Although UAV position drifts may be caused by GPS-degradation, we assumed that all position drift were caused by GPS spoofing attacks to simplify the hacking detection scenarios in this experiment.

When UAVs that were not hacked reached a target, the operator engaged in an imagery task of counting the road intersections from the UAV's camera view at a pre-specified zoom level. This task represents the primary purpose of the mission, which is information gathering. The imagery counting task was participants' primary work load task, and it allowed us to assess their performance based on the number of attempted tasks and the task correctness percentage.



Fig. 4. Histogram of the hacking detection success rate.

TABLE I
THE CONFUSION MATRIX OF HACKING DETECTION DECISIONS IN DIFFERENT NOTIFICATIONS

	Real hacking notification	False alarm notification
Decision of considering UAV was hacked	224	40
Decision of considering UAV was not hacked	63	207

B. *Experiment Subjects and Procedure*

Thirty-six participants took part in this experiment, including 22 males and 14 females. Age ranged from 19 to 34 years with an average of 25.2 and a standard deviation of 3.8 years. Among all participants, 18 participants had little video game experience, 6 participants had monthly gaming experience, 5 participants played video game several times a week, another 5 participants had weekly gaming experience, and only 2 participants had daily gaming experience. The experiment procedure consisted of four main sections including a self-paced tutorial section, a practice section, a test section, and a debriefing section. Specifically, in the test section, each participant finished 2 test sessions, including a counterbalanced high and a low task load scenario. Thus, we had 72 test sessions and collected data from all these sessions.

C. *Experiment Results*

In this experiment, 23 out of total 72 test sessions (32%) resulted in 100% of successful hack identifications, while another 24 (33%) reached above 80% successful attack identification. Thus, as shown in Figure 4, 65% of total test sessions reached 80% correct hacking detection or better without having any prior formal hacking detection training.

Specifically focusing on the difference between real hacking notification and false alarms, as shown in Table I, out of all 287 (224+63) real hacking notifications across all participants, the overall success rate was 78% (224÷287), and for all 247 (40+207) false alarms, the success rate was 84% (207÷247). In other word, the type one error (false positive, operators considered UAV not hacked with real hacking notification) was 22% (63÷287), which was slightly higher than the type two error (false negative, operators considered UAV hacked with



Fig. 5. Boxplot of hacking detection success rate based on different video game experience.

false alarm notification) of 16% (40÷247). Thus, operators were slightly better at detecting false alarms than identifying real hacking notifications.

Task load, as a major experimental factor, only affected UAV damage level (MANOVA F(1,31)=32.93, p<0.001), alpha=0.05), but it did not affect any other performance metric. However, the video game experience covariate had a significant effect on participants correct hacking detections (F(1,31)=4.652, p=0.039), as shown in the boxplot in Figure 5. This means that the more video game experience, the higher the chance of a correct hacking detection. Not surprisingly, seven participants who lost UAVs had no video game experience, and the other 5 who lost UAVs ranged from some to moderate gaming experience. Participants with daily gaming experience did not lose any UAVs and were 100% correct in hacking identification.

These statistical results of our experiment provide high-level understanding of the factors that impacted operators' performance. However, we need to further investigate the underlying nature of why such factors had certain effects on performance. In addition, operators' hacking detection strategies cannot be inferred via statistical results. Therefore, human operator models are needed for further investigating operators' behavior patterns and detection strategies in such UAV supervisory control scenarios.

IV. HMM Model Structure, Training and Selection

As discussed previously, human operator behavior models can illustrate operators behavior patterns and strategies in high-level tasks. Considering that HMMs can infer hidden higher-level operator behavioral states from observable lower-level interactions between the operators and autonomous systems, HMMs were chosen for modeling the observable behaviors from the RESCHU-SA experiment.

A. HMM Model Structure

Based on the classic notation of HMM, the HMM can be formally defined as a tuple [32]:

$$H = \{S, V, A, B\}.$$

TABLE II
Observations (emissions) of HMM models from RESCHU-SA experiment interface

Index	1	2	3	4
Observation	Add waypoint	Move waypoint	Delete waypoint	Move endpoint
Index	5	6	7	8
Observation	Switch target	Engage task	Select UAV	Confirm notification
Index	9	10	11	12
Observation	Ignore notification	Consider UAV hacked	Consider UAV not hacked	Adjust zoom level

Here, $S = \{S_1, S_2, ..., S_N\}$ represents N different hidden states, $V = \{V_1, V_2, ..., V_M\}$ represents M different observations. Also, $A = \{a_{ij}\}$ is a $N \times N$ transition probability matrix, where $a_{ij} = P\{S_j^{t+1}|S_i^t\}$, $i, j = 1, 2, ..., N$, and $B = \{b_{ik}\}$ is a $N \times M$ emission probability matrix, where $b_{ik} = P\{V_k|S_i\}$, $i = 1, 2, ..., N$, $k = 1, 2, ..., M$. In addition, both $a_{ij}, b_{ik} \geq 0$. In HMM models, each hidden state can be considered as a cluster of observations with different weights, which are emission probabilities. The system states (or operator behavioral states, in this paper) transfers among hidden states based on the time sequence, and the probabilities of switching from the current state to the next state are the transition probabilities.

B. HMM Model Training and Selection

The first step in the HMM model training process is state space reduction. In RESCHU-SA, every key stroke and mouse action were recorded in log files, along with the system status. In a HMM, the hidden higher-level behavioral states are clusters of operators' actions, so the interaction data should be aggregations of observations based on a pre-defined state reduction grammar. In this manner, there were 12 possible places for operators to click in RESCHU-SA, which yielded 12 observations, as presented in Table II.

The multi-sequence Baum-Welch algorithm, an unsupervised model training method was used in model training [33]. HMM model training results were then selected (number of hidden states) using the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) [27], [34] and the number of rare states (NRS) method [35] to achieve both high model likelihood values and reasonable model structures. Models with the lowest BIC values are preferred. The BIC criterion balances the increase of model complexity, which is caused by the increase of the model features, by penalizing the number of free parameters in the model training process. The NRS method maintains the simplicity and interpretability of a descriptive model by monitoring all rare states whose occurrence frequency are lower than a certain threshold value, which is usually 5%. Generally, HMM models without any rare state are preferred. When BIC curves are monotonically decreasing, the NRS method can suggest the model with the highest number of hidden states with no any rare state.



Fig. 6. The general human operator behavior HMM model.



Fig. 7. Emission probabilities for the HMM model capturing general operator behavior.

V. General Operator Behavior Model

Understanding that task load did not affect operators' overall performance and success rate in hacking detections and imagery tasks, the general operator behavior model was trained using data from both high and low task load scenarios. As shown in Table II, the general operator behavior HMM model was trained using observation sequences with 12 different observations. Based on the model selection process described previously, the HMM model with 7 states had the lowest BIC value. Also considering the 7-state model did not have any rare states and the HMM models with 8 or more states had at least one rare state, the general operator behavior model was determined to be a 7-state HMM model, as shown in Figure 6. The interpretation for each hidden state was determined by the emission probabilities, shown in Figure 7.

The first state was interpreted as "Manipulate Target" because it was mainly a cluster of observation 4 (Move endpoint), 5 (Switch target), and 7 (Select UAV), which were directly related to UAV target manipulations. The second state was interpreted as "Hacking Detection" because this was the only state that had significant emission to observation 12 (Adjust zoom level), which indicated a typical operation of using a UAV's camera to compare against the map. The third state was interpreted as "Select UAV" because its only major emission was observation 7 (Select UAV). The fourth state was interpreted as "Manipulate waypoint" because it was a cluster of observation 1 (Add waypoint), 2 (Move waypoint), 3 (Delete waypoint) and 7 (Select UAV), which were directly related to waypoint management. The fifth state was interpreted as "Engage Imagery Task" because its only major emission was observation 6 (Engage task), indicating people were executing the intersection counting task. The sixth state was interpreted as "Hacking Decision" because it was the only state that had major emissions to observation 10 (Consider UAV hacked) and 11 (Consider UAV not hacked) which were decisions to hacking events. The seventh state was interpreted as "Initiate hacking detection" because it was the only state that had emissions to observation 8 (Confirm Notification) and 9 (Ignore Notification) which indicated the initiation of hacking detections.

The general operator behavior model represents the operator behavioral states in navigating UAVs, conducting imagery search, and dealing with potential hacking events. The first interesting fact shown in the model is that the UAV navigation (highlighted in blue) and hacking detection (highlighted in orange) functional groups can be distinguished clearly. The transitions between these two function groups represent the probabilities of switching functional groups in operator behavioral states. This distinction shows that operators typically conducted tasks either in UAV navigation or hacking detection, reflecting that operators were switching between two primary objectives of navigating the UAVs and detecting hacking.

Interestingly, a previous study on the original RESCHU platform, which only dealt with the navigation of the UAVs and did not have any hacking considerations [30], exhibited just four similar states to those blue states in Figure 6. This is an important finding since it means that the addition of a new set of tasks did not dramatically change the underlying states, rather the added functionality of hacking detection simply added more states. This suggests that at least in some supervisory control environments, that functions may be modeled in a modular fashion, which would reduce the workload in adapting older models as new functions are added.

In addition, the general RESCHU-SA model in Figure 6 shows some potential inefficiencies in operators' behavior

TABLE III
OBSERVATIONS (EMISSIONS) OF THE HACKING DETECTION STRATEGY HMM MODEL FROM RESCHU-SA EXPERIMENT INTERFACE

Index	1	2	3	4
Observation	Add waypoint	Move waypoint	Delete waypoint	Move endpoint
Index	5	6	7	8
Observation	Switch target	Engage task	Select UAV	Perceive hacking
Index	9	10		
Observation	Detection decision	Adjust zoom level		

patterns. In the navigation functional set of states, the first state of “Manipulate Target” and the fourth state of “Manipulate Waypoint” have high self-transition probabilities. These high self-transition probabilities indicate that once operators entered these two behavioral states, operators tended to conduct repeated operations. For instance, the participant who repeated manipulating targets the most (91 times comparing to the average of 35 times), was enmeshed in the “Manipulate target” state and actually had a low overall performance score of 236 (comparing to the average of 303). These repeated operations indicate potential inefficiencies that could be improved with future designs for the UAV supervisory control interface.

Two hidden states, “Hacking Detection” and “Initiate Hacking Detection”, in the hacking detection functional group also revealed potential problems with self-transitions. Based on statistical analyses, the time consumption in hacking detection was negatively correlated with the hacking detection success rate (Pearson=-0.375, p=0.001). Thus, this fact implies that the longer the person spent investigating a potential hacking event, the less likely a successful detection would occur. This result was curious because as people gather more information, they should increase their probability of successful detection. This results then led us to develop more detailed HMMs about just operators hacking detection strategies in order to shed more light about this unexpected result. These more specific HMMs are detailed in the following section.

VI. Hacking Detection Strategy Model

The HMM in Figure 6 provides an overall view into how operators approached the overall tasks of navigating the UAVs in support of their primary reconnaissance missions, while also dealing with hacking events. However, since this model does not provide enough detail about just exactly how people formed strategies for dealing with the hacking events, we elected to just focus on those operator interactions from the beginning to the end of each hacking event. Overall there were 15 such hacking events per participant. The resulting hacking detection model was trained based on 10 observations instead of the original 12 observations, as shown in Table III. In the revised model training, original observations of “Confirm notification” and “Ignore notification” were combined to “Perceive hacking”, and “Consider UAV hacked” and “Consider UAV not hacked” were combined to “Detection decision”.



Fig. 8. The operator hacking detection strategy model.



Fig. 9. Emission probabilities of the hacking detection strategy model.

As shown in Figure 8, the obtained hacking detection strategy model is a 6-state HMM based on the similar model selection process as used for the general operator behavior model. The interpretation for each hidden state was determined by the emission probabilities shown in Figure 9. Although the observations were slightly different, the interpretation criteria were similar to the general behavior model. The six hidden states were interpreted as 1) the start state of Perceive Hacking; 2) Select UAV; 3) Adjust Target; 4) Engage Imagery Task; 5) Adjust Waypoint; and 6) the end state of Hacking Decision. The 56.8% transition from the End state to the START state represents overlapping hacking detections. This means once operators finished a hacking detection, roughly half of operators then went on to solve another hacking event that occurred almost coincidentally with the current event.



Fig. 10. Master participant strategies in hacking detection strategy model.

A. Hacking Detection Strategies

Two major behavioral state transitions (aka operation flows) in the hacking detection HMM model can be observed based on transition probabilities, as shown in Figure 10. Such transitions are considered as detection strategies because they start from the START state, in which operators perceived hacking events, to the END state, in which operators determined detection results. The first major flow, indicated by blue arrows, has one single intermediate state of "Adjust waypoint" between the start and the end state. The second major flow, indicated by red arrows, has two intermediate states of "Adjust target" and "Select UAV" between the start and the end. These two major operation flows suggest two dominant hacking detection strategies, termed "waypoint-oriented strategy" and "target-oriented strategy".

In the waypoint-oriented strategy, operators tended to manipulate UAV waypoints, including adding and moving waypoints, to detect hacking events. In this hacking detection strategy, to investigate the potential differences in the scene between the camera view and the surrounding map area, operators typically either manipulated or introduced waypoints. Operators who used this strategy typically fixated on comparing the effects of turning the UAV and the appearance of the ground in the camera feed to that expected while turning on the map. This can be considered a dynamic strategy as motion was a key element in the determination of location.

In the target-oriented strategy, operators tended to directly switch UAV targets to detect hacking events. In this strategy, operators were typically focused more on the specific landmarks that the UAVs would fly over, such as unusual intersections or buildings. This can be considered a static strategy as operators would wait until the UAV reached a place of interest to make a hacked or not hacked decision. Both strategies revealed inefficiencies, primarily through the self-transition probabilities. For example, in the waypoint-oriented strategy, 62% of people stayed in this state, repeatedly adding, moving, and deleting waypoints. Similarly, 37% of people repeatedly redirected vehicles to other targets, suggesting an inefficient target selection process. These actions suggest inefficiencies that potentially could be made better with advanced decision support, which is an area of future work.

TABLE IV
PARTICIPANT CLASSIFICATION BASED ON DIFFERENT HACKING DETECTION STRATEGIES

Index	Strategy	Number	Percentage
1	Waypoint strong dominant	10	27.8%
2	Waypoint weak dominant	7	19.4%
3	Target weak dominant	11	30.6%
4	Target strong dominant	8	22.2%

The occurrence frequency and percentages of the waypoint- and target-oriented strategies for each participant was obtained by applying the hacking detection HMM model to each participant's data using the Viterbi algorithm [27]. Based on the occurrence percentage of the adjust waypoint and adjust target states, participants were classified into different hacking detection categories. As shown in the Table IV, participants were classified into four categories, including 1) waypoint strong dominant strategy; 2) waypoint weak dominant strategy; 3) target weak dominant strategy; and 4) target strong dominant strategy. The population of each strategy category was approximately one fourth of the total participant population.

Another repeated-measure multi-variate ANOVA model with a significance level of 0.05 was used to analyze the impact of different hacking detection strategies on participants' performance and hacking detection success rate. In this rm-MANOVA model, strategy categories were considered as a between-subject factor. The rm-MANOVA model showed that different hacking detection strategies did not affect the overall participants' performance (F(3,27)=0.754, p=0.530), their hacking detection success rate (F(3,27)=0.086, p=0.967), and their imagery counting task success rate (F(3,27)=1.528, p=0.230). Thus, when examining the aggregate group, no strategy dominated in terms of performance. However, given that the only operator who had perfect performance were the two operators with daily game experience, we examined their strategies in detail in the next section to shed more light on which strategies could potentially produce the best outcomes.

B. Master Participant Hacking Strategies

Developing separate HMM models for the two master participants was not possible due to the limited data, however, operator state paths can provide a map of individual strategies. As shown in Figure 10, the two dominant hacking detection strategies are highlighted separately to represent the two master participant strategies. The red path represents the first master participant's operation flow, and the blue path represents the second master participant's operation flow.

As depicted in Figure 10, the master participants represented the two dominant strategies shown in the hacking detection model of Figure 8. The first master participant exhibited the target-oriented strategy, spending an average of 81.1 seconds in each hacking detection (overall average for target-dominant people was 100.3 seconds). The second master participant exhibited the waypoint-adjusted strategy, spending an average of 50.5 seconds in each hacking detection (overall average for waypoint-dominant people was 81.8 seconds). The two master participants demonstrated the two dominant strategies shown in the model for all participants and both master participants achieved 100% detection, so there is no clear dominant strategy in terms of quality of final decision. However, there was a clear difference in speed with the waypoint-oriented strategy taking, on average, 30s less to accomplish, which can be seen in the two strategies in Figure 10 where the Target-oriented strategy has an additional state. This is a practically significant number as intervening as quickly as possible in the middle of a hacking event is paramount. So, while this analysis reveals no dominant strategy in terms of detection a hacking event, it does suggest that the waypoint-oriented strategy is likely to lead to faster results, which could be very important in prosecuting actual events.

VII. Conclusion

The human operator behavior models in this study present the feasibility of investigating operator behavior patterns and strategies in conducting supervisory control tasks through the use of HMMs. From operator behavior models, we can investigate factors that potentially impact operator behavior patterns and their higher-level strategies. Observed strategies from a single HMM can provide engineers and researchers a practical approach to investigating human operators' strategies in human supervisory control scenarios.

The general behavior model, derived using RESCHU-SA-based experiments, shows seven major human operator behavioral states for supervision of UAVs that could be subject to hacking events. In this model, two functional groups emerged, including a hacking detection group with three behavioral states and a UAV navigation group with four states. Operators generally switched between functional groups as demands dictated, i.e., when a hacking event emerged, operators moved from the navigation flow to the hacking flow, indicating that such functions could be seen as modular.

A 6-state hacking detection strategy model allowed us to investigate operator hacking detection strategies in detail. Two major strategies can be observed from the model, including waypoint-oriented and target-oriented strategies. Based on statistical results, different hacking detection strategies did not affect operators' overall performance and success rate in hacking detection. Although no single best hacking detection strategy emerged in terms of quality, one strategy was superior in terms of time to correct decision.

Although this geo-location approach for UAV hacking detection is still in an experimental stage, these initial results suggest that such an approach could enhance the security of future supervisory unmanned vehicle control systems if hacking notifications are provided. Considering no hacking notification misses were introduced in this experiment, as a future study we will investigate the potential effects on operators' performance and detection strategies if the autonomous system fails to provide notifications. In addition, certain limitations still exist in our HMM method, including limited model training data and required experimenter subjective judgment in hidden state interpretation, which is a fundamental issue for all unsupervised machine learning approaches. Current research is underway to determine how to make such model interpretation more straightforward as well as improve sensitivity analysis methods to reveal weaknesses in employed assumptions.

These descriptive operator behavior models highlight the fact that even effective strategies can be inefficient. Further work is needed to determine why people adopt different strategies and whether additional assistance can be used to improve operators' strategies, either through training or a decision support system. Finally, the development and utilization of predictive behavior models can contribute to the future development of real-time guidance systems, which monitor operators constantly and provide real-time operational guidance.

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